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Political Economy of Communication: A Critique 
Overview 
The broad range of studies that fall under the heading of “political economy of 
communication” has been growing and diversifying these past fifty years or so in much 
the same way as classical political economy did from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards. For some, it is an area of study that focuses on mass media industry structures, 
emphasising the effects of ownership on political systems. For others, it is a study of 
various moments in what might be called the “commodity” cycle in mass media: 
production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. For others, it is only one or two of 
these moments, the most prominent of those being distribution and consumption. Some 
studies emphasise content, others technology. Some emphasise flows of information 
within various econometric frameworks. In this chapter, I proceed firstly by tracing the 
historical development of “political economy of communication” as a recognisable field 
of scholarship. I then identify the various approaches that characterise this relatively 
young field and offer a critique of these. Finally, I suggest a theoretical and 
methodological synthesis for the development of a robust political economy of 
communication and some directions for future research.  
Key definitions and a brief history 
I define political economy here as the study of how values of all kinds are 
produced, distributed, exchanged, and consumed (the economic); how power is produced, 
distributed, exchanged, and exercised (the political); and how these aspects of the social 
world are related at any given place and time in history. A political economy of 
communication is therefore concerned with understanding how communication figures in 
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political economic formations more generally. Although I understand “communication” 
as the movement of meanings between people and “communications” (or communication 
technologies) as the means by which those meanings are moved, for the purposes of this 
chapter I am conflating these two definitions in the term “communication”. I am aware 
that such a definition may be criticised for confounding two very distinct perspectives on 
how we make, move, and exchange meanings by collapsing the “content” and 
“technologies” of human communication, but such a terminological move is not 
altogether a matter of convenience in the thoroughly technologised communication 
environments in which we live. Further, the perspective it implies can be understood in 
terms of Silverstone’s mediation approach and has the advantage of not separating 
meaning from its means of movement (Silverstone, 1999). The only exception I make to 
this act of terminological conflation is in reference to “new media”, by which I mean 
periods in time during which new technologies become prominent and widespread means 
of communication. I use the term “new media” in a technological sense to denote new 
means of movement for communication.   
Roots 
As a recognised field of study, political economy of communication has its most 
obvious roots in the concept of ‘knowledge monopolies’ as developed by Canadian 
economist Harold Innis (1942, 1944, 1950, 1951a, 1951b). Innis coined this term to 
illustrate the fact that throughout history certain privileged groups (priests, kings, 
bureaucrats, soldiers, scientists, etc) have enjoyed a monopoly of access to certain kinds 
of knowledge. Innis therefore tends to appear as the pioneer of all political contemporary 
economic studies in the field of media. Of course even from the period during which Innis 
wrote we must also acknowledge Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/1998) whose essay on 
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the ‘culture industry’ continues to have relevance for current circumstances (Silverstone, 
1999). But I believe we cannot stop here in identifying the historical development of the 
field. Political economy of communication becomes visible during the second decade of 
the twentieth century, when such figures as Harold Lasswell (1927, 1941) and Edward 
Bernays (1928, 1945) appear as significant scholars in the study of mass communication 
strategies. Both clearly understand the political economic implications of new media and 
their attendant capabilities to change the character and functioning of societies. At this 
time, we see a concern with ‘propaganda’, a term that did not have the automatically 
negative connotations it carries today.  
According to Lasswell,  
Propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant 
symbols. The word attitude is taken to mean a tendency to act according to certain 
patterns of evaluation. The existence of an attitude is not a direct datum of experience, but 
an inference from science which have a conventionalised significance. … The valuational 
patterns upon which this inference is founded may be primitive gestures of the face and 
body, or more sophisticated gestures of the pen and voice. Taken together, these objects 
which have a standard meaning in a group are called significant symbols. The elevated 
eyebrow, the clenched fist, the sharp voice, the pungent phrase, have their references 
established within the web of a particular culture. Such significant symbols are 
paraphernalia employed in expressing the attitudes, and they are also capable of being 
employed to reaffirm or redefine attitudes. (Lasswell, 1927: 627, my emphasis)  
Lasswell’s is a political economic understanding of communication. ‘Patterns of 
evaluation’ and ‘valuational patterns’ are other ways to say “value”, which is both an 
abstract and a concrete term. When it functions as a noun, “value” is a huge abstraction, a 
generality that incorporates many aspects of human experience. However as a verb it can 
become very concrete and particular—particular people actively value particular ways of 
being, seeing, and acting; particular types of food, entertainment, and politics; particular 
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codes of morality and traditions of kinship; and so on. By recognising  that ‘patterns of 
evaluation’ within ‘the web of a particular culture’ are the primary objects of propaganda, 
Lasswell does not separate the economic from the political. People evaluating aspects of 
the world in historically and culturally particular ways, and then acting upon those 
evaluations in negative or positive ways, is how specific cultural values get produced. An 
important point Lasswell makes here is that, to be effective objects of propaganda, 
‘symbols’ must first enjoy a degree of culturally shared significance. Communication 
therefore plays a central role in what people do because it is through communication that 
symbols gain significance within a culture. Similarly, communication is the means by 
which significant symbols are attributed with positive and negative attributes, thus 
altering patterns of evaluation towards particular cultural objects. In turn, actions towards 
“symbols”—which in Lasswell’s definition can include persons, whole countries, 
religions, ethnic groups, and political roles—change (Lasswell, 1941).   
This is not as abstract or idealist as it might seem. Lasswell’s ‘collective attitude’ 
is not on a ‘plane apart from individual actions’ (1927: 628). Rather, he sees ‘the 
collective attitude’ as a ‘pattern’ which designates ‘standard uniformities of conduct at a 
given time and place’ (1927: 628). The ‘collective attitude’ is a ‘distribution of individual 
acts and not an indwelling spirit which has achieved transitory realization in the rough, 
coarse facts of the world of sense’ (1927: 628). Lasswell differentiates the techniques of 
attitude change by psychological means from means of propaganda. Psychological means 
require having ‘access to the individual’s private stock of meanings’, whereas propaganda 
is based on ‘the standard meanings of the groups of which the individual is a member’ 
and therefore requires anthropological and sociological understandings (1927: 628). 
Lasswell’s is not a crude structuralist understanding of group behaviour. He sees that the 
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individual moves through what are now known as multiple ‘discourse communities’, and 
that each of these groups has its own peculiar attitudinal patterns that can be manipulated 
(cf. Lemke, 1995). Attitudinal patterns are typical but not universal within a given group 
(Lemke, 1998). They are materially formed and enacted.  
For Lasswell, propaganda may be positive or negative, but its object is always 
cultural values: 
Every cultural group has its vested values … An object toward which it is hoped to arouse 
hostility must be presented as a menace to as many of these values as possible. There are 
always ambitious hopes of increasing values, and the object must be made to appear as a 
stumbling block to their realization. There are patterns of right and wrong, and the object 
must be made to flout the good. There are standards of propriety, and the object must 
appear ridiculous and gauche. If the plan is to draw out positive attitudes toward an 
object, it must be presented, not as a menace and an obstruction, nor as despicable or 
absurd, but as a protector of our values, a champion of our dreams, and a model of virtue 
and propriety. (1927: 630) 
The means by which desirable or undesirable attitudes are organised towards the objects 
of propaganda are not oriented towards making people accept ‘an idea without reflection’, 
nor are they even concrete “suggestions”; they are, rather, the manipulation of ‘cultural 
material with a recognizable meaning’ (1927: 631). Moreover, all means of propaganda 
are a ‘form of words’, whether ‘spoken, written, pictorial, or musical, and the number of 
stimulus carriers is infinite’ (1927: 631). Because of ‘technological changes’, especially 
the new medium of radio, increased literacy, and because most of what could ‘formerly be 
done by violence and coercion must now be done by argument and persuasion’, Lasswell 
asserts that propaganda is in fact necessary for the operation of democracy (1927: 631). 
His view is that because of advances in communication technologies, increased literacy, 
and the widespread ‘ventilation of opinions and the taking of votes’, democracy ‘has 
proclaimed the dictatorship of palaver, and the technique of dictating to the dictator is 
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named propaganda’ (1927: 631). There is an inseparable and concrete link between the 
political and the economic here: the production and manipulation of attitudinal patterns 
(“values”) is the means by which political outcomes are achieved in democracy.  
For Edward Bernays (1928), generally considered by the modern Public Relations 
industry as its pioneer, propaganda is primarily psychological but still oriented towards 
the formation of attitudinal meaning: ‘from the broadest standpoint, [propaganda] is the 
power of the [ruling] group to sway the larger public in its attitude’ (1928: 958). The 
technique of propaganda is ‘the psychology of public persuasion’ (1928: 959). But, he 
notes, sociological techniques are just as important to successful propaganda as those of 
psychology (1928: 961). The process of ‘manipulating public opinion’ begins with 
‘statistics’ and ‘field-surveying’ (1928: 961). Knowledge of ‘group cleavages of society, 
the importance of group leaders, and the habits of their followers’ are essential knowledge 
for the successful propagandist (1928: 961). Armed with such knowledge, the 
propagandist must learn how, within given groups, to make ‘an old principle apply to a 
new idea’; to substitute ‘ideas by changing clichés’; to overcome prejudices, to make ‘a 
part stand for the whole’; and to create ‘events and circumstances that stand for his ideas’ 
(1928: 961). Bernays considers that ‘a circumstance or circumstances of dramatic 
moment’ are events that change and establish the ‘functioning of given attitudes toward 
given subjects, such as religion, sex, race, morality, nationalism, internationalism, and so 
forth’ (1928: 961). Whether the object is attitudes towards hats, sexuality, or God, 
Bernays argues that, in the ‘age of mass production’, there must be a corresponding 
‘technique for the mass distribution of ideas’ and attitudes, and thus for the mass 
production of public attitudes (1928: 971). Whether ‘salad dressing’ or a US ‘presidential 
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candidate’, means of production oriented towards the formation of attitudinal meaning are 
entirely a matter of understanding and manipulating socially shared attitudes (1928: 971).  
In the propagandists’ work we see an increasing emphasis on the role of 
communication in the production of values and power. We also see a strong emphasis on 
the relationship between economic and political power. Merely a decade after Bernays 
and Lasswell wrote on the manipulation of public opinion, there is already widespread 
concern about the amounts of money being spent on US election campaigns (Poole, 1939: 
371). But this is merely a quantitative aspect of a qualitative change in the way patterns of 
evaluation are produced within the public sphere. Elections and opinion polls are ways of 
arriving at ‘value judgements’ (1939: 371). Poole claims that at the most fundamental 
level ‘there is a choice between divine and human judgement’, and that having given God 
short shrift we must now rely solely on human judgement (1939: 372). Poole reduces the 
‘determination of values’ by humans to two ‘principles’ of judgement, one  based in ‘the 
qualitative or heroic’, the other, ‘quantitative and statistical’ (p. 372). Here we see an 
antecedent of Innis’s approach to political economy of communication and a reiteration of 
Marx’s emphasis on space and time. Judgements  
by either the qualitative or quantitative principle may take place in two dimensions. These 
dimensions may be called conveniently time and space. The dimension of time is 
historical and its use opens up the store of human judgements found in the records of 
history and the enduring monuments of literature and art. The other dimension is simply 
that which we are more accustomed to think of in this ordinary connection, running at 
right angles to time (1939: 374).   
Poole sees the possibility of what we now call “direct democracy” destroying 
representative government because of a tendency towards ‘laziness or moral cowardice’ 
on the part of ‘legislators and executive leaders’ (1939: 374):  
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They are honestly disposed to believe that the “voice of the people” (that is a majority) is 
the voice of God or Truth; or, to state the matter less theologically, that in a human world 
the best value judgement is the judgement of the greatest number of humans on any given 
problem at any given time. This is the quantitative or statistical, as opposed to the solely 
qualitative, idea. We have come to be so committed to it in our political philosophy that 
the cost and fuss and noise of the elections and polls are taken for granted—even 
welcomed, as adornments of our political life, which perhaps they are. (1939: 374).  
The historical search for ‘judgements in the dimension of time’ is firstly based on ‘the 
qualitative or heroic principle’, a kind of ‘“Gallup poll” taken in the dimension of time’. 
(1939: 375). Thus with the introduction of Gallup’s (1938) techniques, ‘value judgements 
in the domain of public affairs are come to, apparently, by an interesting, and rather 
reassuring, interaction and cross-control between the qualitative and quantitative 
principles operating in the two dimensions of time and space’ (Poole, 1939: 375). Poole 
appeals to an apparently static set of value judgements set in past and based on the 
‘heroic’ quality of past judgements, and the ‘statistical’ judgements of the great mass of 
people as measured by techniques such as those of Gallup (1938) and Bernays (1928).  
Gallup (1938) held no such conceptions of historical balance in matters of 
judgement, preferring to think of the perfect democracy as an immediate relationship 
between political action and ongoing measurements of public opinion:  
James Bryce said that the next and final stage in our democracy would be reached if the 
will of the majority of citizens were to be ascertainable at all times. 
With the development of the science of measuring public opinion, it can be stated with but 
few qualifications, that this stage in our democracy is rapidly being reached. It is now 
possible to ascertain, with a high degree of accuracy, the views of the people on all 
national issues. (Gallup, 1938: 9) 
For Gallup, the usefulness of polling is not to be confined to government or politics. It can 
be ‘equally useful in the field of social problems’ (1938: 13). Once sufficient is known 
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about specific attitudes - opinions about welfare, religious prejudice, venereal disease, 
and any problem of attitude whatsoever -  they can be addressed ‘with equal success’ 
(1938: 13-14). Therefore ‘with many of our leading psychologists and social scientists’ 
interested in the problem of measuring public opinion, ‘it will not be long before the final 
stage in the development of our democracy, as described by Bryce, has been reached—
that the will of the majority of citizens can be ascertained at all times’ (1938: 14). 
Questions about the relationship between the “facts” of public opinion research, the 
possibility of centralised control of mass communication, and the quality of government 
and its organs appear to elude Gallup in his enthusiasm for an early end to the history of 
democracy. These questions, muted and blurred by Gallup’s enthusiasms for direct 
democracy, were answered with a resounding blast from Western Europe, the shockwaves 
of which are still being felt today.  
Political economy of communication in Nazi Germany  
No political economy of communication can exclude the remarkable efforts of the 
Nazi Germany propagandists to produce new cultural patterns of evaluation, and therefore 
new politics, on a massive scale. For the Nazis, like Bernays and Lasswell, propaganda is 
qualitatively different from advertising; it is a matter of moral obligation to the public, a 
value and public good in itself:  
Political propaganda may not be confused with advertising. Advertising changes its target 
as needed. … Advertising agencies push one thing today, another tomorrow, each time 
making it sound as if nothing else in the world is worth mentioning. There is no thought 
of moral or national values. "Ballyhoo" is advertising at any price, with no moral content, 
no moral thought or responsibility. The Americans made "ballyhoo" against Germany 
during the World War until the American public finally believed that the Germans were 
cannibals whose elimination would be a godly deed. "Ballyhoo" is unlimited, arbitrary 
exaggeration. In a political sense, it is incitement, distortion, and it is all immoral.  
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When we talk about the necessity of political propaganda, we seek powerful moral goals. 
We want to make our people a united nation that confidently and clearly understands 
National Socialism's policies, quickly and correctly. We cannot change our political 
principles as we would a consumer good, becoming random, irresponsible and immoral. 
We do not want to distort, confuse or incite, rather clarify, unify, and tell the truth. 
Political propaganda is the highest responsibility, it is a moral duty, a national duty. We 
may never think there is too much of it, or that it is superfluous. (Wells, 1936) 
Moral and national values are conflated in Nazi political economy of communication. The 
following summarises the position: ‘For us, gold is not a measure of the value of money. 
Our foundation is German labor and confidence in the Führer’ (Lange, in NSDAP, 1939). 
“Attitude” and “value” are also synonymous for the Nazi propagandists. These are 
testable aspects of human experience which are open to profitable manipulation: 
The National Socialist worldview is an attitude, an attitude that must show a courageous 
face to the outside, but domestically be infused with camaraderie. If the people are to 
continue to believe in the National Socialist movement, the movement must maintain and 
guard this camaraderie and pass it on to the future. The struggle behind us is unique. 
Future generations will be spared such a struggle. It must be replaced by a firm attitude, 
which can only be tested in every day life. Our task is to reawaken the old values of 
courage and pride in our people, and to do all that we see as necessary. 
… world history today must be rewritten, and that we will do the rewriting. It would be a 
mistake to delegate the task to the teachers and professors who wrote previous histories, 
for they grew up under the old world and were educated in it. The 2000 year old Christian 
age is dying and a new national Socialist world under Adolf Hitler is being born. The 
youth are growing up in this new world. Our task is to serve these ideas and to lead the 
struggle. Then we will be able to look confidently into the future. (Rosenberg, 1939, in 
NSDAP, 1939). 
The paranoid values of eugenics, social Darwinism, and the natural state of an all-
pervasive competition for survival were propagated throughout Germany, through film 
(Hippler, 1937); radio (Goebbels, 1933); printed materials, and by every means and 
available to the propagandists, including cultural gatherings, mass marches, ‘stickers’, 
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and especially through the spoken and written word (Stark, 1930). Children were not to be 
excluded from the logic that inheres in seeing our world as a manifestation of the 
competition of every living thing against every other. A fifth-grade text-book ‘for young 
girls’ from the Nazi era is instructive here:  
We have established that all creatures, plants as well as animals, are in a continual battle 
for survival. Plants crowd into the area they need to grow. Every plant that fails to secure 
enough room and light must necessarily die. Every animal that does not secure sufficient 
territory and guard it against other predators, or lacks the necessary strength and speed or 
caution and cleverness will fall prey to its enemies. The army of plant eaters threatens the 
plant kingdom. Plant eaters are prey for carnivores. The battle for existence is hard and 
unforgiving, but is the only way to maintain life. This struggle eliminates everything that 
is unfit for life, and selects everything that is able to survive. (Harm and Wiehle, 1942, p. 
168) 
A pattern of valuing and corollary imperatives for action were produced in the mass 
propagation of such understandings. Appeals to fear; immutable laws of nature; a 
traumatised mass psychology; doctrines of scarce resources; work as the highest good; the 
necessity of being the dominant nation; racial “hygiene” and superiority; the utilitarian 
view of science, technology, and truth—these formed the basis of Nazi propaganda. The 
comprehensive range of the Nazis’ appeals, combined with the centralised control of 
public communication, had intense, widespread, and vicious effects. The sole objective of 
Nazi propaganda was quite simple: to change the nation’s “patterns of evaluation”—put 
abstractly, to produce new “values” on a national scale to achieve particular political 
ends. The task of Nazi propaganda     
is to free those who today still are rooted and anchored in the foreign ideas of  liberalism 
and Marxism, to make them feel, think and act according to National Socialism, to bring 
them to the point where they judge and evaluate everything according to National 
Socialist principles. (Dietz, 1934, my emphasis) 
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The nation’s patterns of evaluation were successfully manipulated by the Party, and the 
rest, as they say, is history. It may seem reductionist and cold to say that Nazi Germany 
owed its short-lived “successes” to a sophisticated understanding of political economy of 
communication, but it is difficult to deny that the regime successfully set out to achieve 
the production of an entirely new set of values for German people, that its communication 
strategies were oriented towards the production of those values, and that in achieving its 
objectives, the Nazi regime produced a literal explosion of activity that moved according 
to the patterns of evaluation that were produced.  
Contemporary concerns 
Starting with Harold Innis (1942, 1944, 1950, 1951a, 1951b) political economy of 
communication became a recognisable field, probably because of Innis’s disciplinary 
background as an economic historian. While it might be said that Innis is responsible to 
some significant degree for the straw man that separates communication technologies 
from communication, by focusing on the relationship between communication 
technologies and forms of civilization, Innis provided an historical materialist method for 
studying political economies of communication, a method that has proved invaluable 
scholars that followed. By separating communication “content” from technological form, 
Innis provides a means for seeing how new media can sustain, erode, or otherwise 
transform various kinds of civilisations throughout history based on the types of 
technologies used to maintain ‘knowledge monopolies’ (1950, 1951a, 1951b). He also 
helpfully expanded conceptions of media, just as the term was becoming singular and 
monolithic: “The Media”. Innis helped show that myth, prayer, alphabet, architecture, 
libraries, transport systems, weaponry, and many other technologies as means of 
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communication, and therefore as means of producing, sustaining, and destroying 
knowledge monopolies, civilizations, and their associated cultures (1951b).  
Innis’s colleague, Marshall McLuhan (1964), extended the technology-as-medium 
perspective to the point at which people felt impelled to deploy “technological 
determinism” as a negative epithet to describe McLuhan’s work and anything that 
resembled it. Such criticisms notwithstanding, McLuhan remains a key figure in the 
development of political economy of communication, emphasising the human sensory 
apparatus, its relation to various values that, for example, oral- and visually-oriented 
media produce, and to the political and cultural effects that technological transformations 
entail. In many ways, McLuhan and Innis opened the way for the work of social 
historians of technology, such as Lynne White Jr (1940, 1965, 1974), Lewis Mumford 
(1961, 1964), Langdon Winner (1986), and David F. Noble (1997), to be included in 
political economies of communication. Their inclusion in the field recognises the fact that 
technologies have a communicative dimension and play a significant role in political 
economic formations: as much of means of production for capitalism or whichever system 
of political economy in which specific technologies appear, they are also means of 
producing culturally and historically specific systems of meaning. While such inclusions 
sometimes threaten to place too much emphasis on the “purely” technological, the 
foregrounding of the technological and its social character has been an important 
development in political economies of communication, one that has yet to be fully 
incorporated into the field. Perhaps that is because what has become “mainstream” in the 
field takes as its definition of “value” the purely monetary dimension, and a seeming 
monolith, “The Media”, as its primary object of study. This is akin to the emergence of 
what has become mainstream ‘economics’, after economics broke away from the 
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remnants of late-nineteenth classical political economy, approximately between the years 
of 1916-1920 (Graham, 2003).   
Contemporary “mainstream” approaches 
By “mainstream” I mean those scholars who are most influential in the field of 
political economy of communication and who, through scholarly political economies of 
communication, define the field. Most of these studies focus on mass media ownership 
and its broad societal effects (eg Garnham, 1990; Schiller, 1996; McChesney, 2000; 
McChesney & Schiller, 2003, Bagdikian, 1997; Mansell, 2004; Wasko, 2001; Mosco, 
1996; Mosco & Foster, 2001).  
McChesney (2000) identifies two main dimensions in ‘the political economy of 
communication’  
First, it addresses the nature of the relationship between media and communication 
systems on the one hand and the broader social structure of society. In other words, it 
examines how media and communication systems and content reinforce, challenge or 
influence existing class and social relations. It does this with a particular interest in how 
economic factors influence politics and social relations. Second, the political economy of 
communication looks specifically at how ownership, support mechanisms (e.g. 
advertising) and government policies influence media behavior and content. This line of 
inquiry emphasizes structural factors and the labor process in the production, distribution 
and consumption of communication. (McChesney, 2000: 109) 
In McChesney’s definition, the focus is on how ‘media and communication systems and 
content’ do certain things (‘reinforce’, ‘influence’) to ‘existing class and social relations’, 
with a special focus on the role of ‘economic factors’; and, second, how ‘ownership, 
support mechanisms, and government policies influence media behaviour and content’. 
The main difficulty I have with McChesney’s definition is that it appears to lack a theory 
of value, or at the very least appears to presuppose one. This is most apparent when 
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‘economic factors’ are taken for granted and are entirely separated from ‘politics and 
social relations’ by being placed in subjective relation to them. That is to say: ‘economic 
factors’ (the subject) act upon ‘politics and social relations’ (the object). In the second 
part of the definition, this relation is reversed to some degree. Here, ‘ownership’ (an 
economic factor), ‘support systems’ such as ‘advertising’ (another economic factor: 
revenue) and policies (the primary product of ‘politics’) are subject and ‘media behaviour 
and content’ are object. Value is sidelined, politics, social structure, social relations, and 
economic factors are separated, only to be placed in apparently arbitrary transitive 
relationships with each other.  
These are not uncommon moves in defining political economy of communication, 
especially given dominant understandings of what “economics” means, a point that 
McChesney readily acknowledges when he says media  
‘economics’ often provides microanalysis of how media firms and markets operate but, 
like the field of mainstream economics, it assumes the existing social and class relations 
are a given, and a benevolent one at that. Likewise, communication policy studies 
examine the influence of government policies on media performance, but the work 
generally presupposes the necessary existence of the market and the broader social 
situation as the best of all possible worlds. The dominant form of communication research 
in the USA is drawn from quantitative behavioral social science. This work tends to be the 
polar opposite of the political economy of communication: it presupposes capitalist 
society as a given and then discounts structural factors in explaining media behavior. 
(McChesney, 2000) 
Much of this can be explained through a history of intellectual history. Economics, 
politics, and sociology, along with the totality of social sciences, have been slowly 
“disciplined”—separated from each other in theory—from the middle of the nineteenth 
century onwards (Graham, 2003). This, even though they are now more closely 
intertwined than ever in their application. As McChesney points out, government policies 
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are shaped by quantitative microeconomic analyses, sociologically informed opinion 
polls, and often Darwinian behaviourist accounts of humanity. Political economy of 
communication differs from media economics’ allegedly Panglossian view of the world 
by including the effects of political economic formations.  
However, if the primary goal of political economies of communication is to 
comprehend and change social inequalities created by communication practices for the 
better—as most political economists of communication claim it is—then the field requires 
a comprehensive theory of value at its foundation. Not only can the many sub-disciplines 
of social science today be seen as “fractured” social theory, but as social theory fractured 
along the lines of specific aspects of value; or, as society evaluated, conceived of, and 
reconstrued according to certain categories and methods of measurement which are 
peculiar to the sub-disciplines of social science. Such measurements are an intrinsic part 
of political economies of communication in the current context and they appear as 
powerful facts in the development of mainstream political economies of communication 
(Graham, 2004). Any critical theory integrates fractured aspects of social science 
(Marcuse and Neumann, 1942/1998: 95) and must therefore begin with an integrated 
formulation of value (Marx 1973: 259).  
Where communication is concerned, the evaluative dimension extends far beyond 
the “purely economic”, which is to say the pecuniary dimension of value, or more 
commonly, money (Graham, 2001). The exercise of power and the production of values 
are inextricable, and power is merely one form of value translated into another (Graham, 
2002). This is quite overt where money values are concerned: wealth clearly translates 
into political and social power. But where less quantifiable aspects of value are 
concerned—for example, moral, cognitive, aesthetic, ethnic, cultural, and technical 
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values—the task of political economies of communication becomes oriented towards 
making these values explicit and showing them in their full connection with political 
economy more generally.  
To such an end Robin Mansell (2004) argues that ‘a revitalization of the political 
economy of media and communications’ is required ‘in order to achieve a more holistic 
account of the dynamics of new media production and consumption’ (2004: 97). The core 
of the argument is that  
any political economy of new media must be as concerned with symbolic form, meaning 
and action as it is with structures of power and institutions. If resources are scarce, and if 
power is unequally distributed in society, then the key issue is how these scarce resources 
are allocated and controlled, and with what consequences for human action. Distinctions 
between the older and newer media relate to how and why scarcity conditions emerge and 
the extent to which they contribute to the reproduction of unequal social conditions. 
Without research that gives a central place to power as a ‘headline’ issue in new media 
studies, we can only speculate about how inequality may be reproduced and then seen as 
the ‘natural’ outcome of innovations in new media technologies. (2004: 97) 
Again, though, it is difficult to link ‘symbolic form, meaning and action’ with ‘structures 
of power and institutions’ without a relatively sophisticated theory of value in 
communication. How do specific symbolic forms, along with their specific meaning, 
impact upon our power structures and institutions? How should we research these links? 
Mansell suggests particular sites for research, such as the ‘open source software 
movement’ (2004: 101), and identifies ‘the need to construct not only an interdisciplinary 
research agenda for the study of new media, but an explicitly critical (in contrast to a 
mainstream) research agenda’ in order to make ‘issues of power explicit in the analysis of 
mediated experience’ (2004: 102). However, Mansell neglects to note that ‘power’ is 
merely a translation of one form of value into another, explicitly separating the two by 
asking the question: ‘What dominant principles, values and perceptions of power are 
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being embedded in our technologically-mediated interactions?’ (2004: 103). “Power” can 
be a manifestation of prestige, or strength, or wealth, or institutional standing, or various 
combinations of these values, along with many others (Graham, 2002).  
There are other difficulties with Mansell’s argument, not the least of which is the 
assumption that effective power in political economies of communication operates on the 
principle of ‘scarce’ resources when it seems the opposite is most likely to be true. This 
can be seen if we take the propagandists’ work into account, or the work of the Creel 
Committee (Graham & Luke, 2003). The more resources for communication that are 
made available in a political economic system, the more effectively political economies of 
communication can operate in significant ways to produce new values. To make mass 
networks of mediation effective, and to weave masses of people into networks of 
mediation, both means and content must be produced and distributed in abundance. That 
is how new evaluative patterns are produced in a given social system. Questions of value 
in political economies of communication are not therefore concerned with what is scarce, 
but rather with what is produced, exchanged, distributed, and “consumed” in abundance. 
Of course the products of mediation are rarely (if ever) consumed, even though they 
might certainly be “used”. Moreover, whether “technologies” or “contents”, they gain in 
values the more they are used, entirely in contradiction to laws of value for most other 
commodity forms. This is all the more so in digital networks, where digitised symbolic 
artefacts never (in theory) deteriorate with age.  
As it is defined in the mainstream, political economy of communication  
cannot provide a comprehensive explanation of all communication activity, but it can 
explain certain issues extremely well and it provides a necessary context for most other 
research questions in communication. Although the political economy of communication 
can be applied to the study of precapitalist and postcapitalist societies and communication 
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systems, it is primarily concerned with capitalist societies and commercial media systems, 
as these models dominate across the world (Mosco, 1996). 
While I agree that it is necessary to consider the political economy of communication as a 
context for most questions pertaining to communication, I disagree with Mosco’s 
assertion that the capitalist system dominates the world. It ignores the emergence and 
triumph of corporatism throughout the course of the twentieth century (Saul, 1997; 
Graham & Luke 2003). Most political economic formations of communication have 
emerged under corporatist principles, from the mass mediations of the Creel Committee in 
1916; to Hitlerism, Fascism, Stalinist Sovietism, and the many “new-deal” public radio 
initiatives in the 1930s; to the massive state-approved “monopolies” that have emerged in 
the late-twentieth to early twenty-first centuries. In France, for instance, ‘a total of 70 % 
of national newspapers are the property of two armament manufacturers’ (Le Monde, 
2004). Political economies of communication must at least comprehend the organising 
principles of their political contexts. Capitalism, which assumes relatively free markets, 
relatively free trade, relatively diverse ownership, and steadily lower labour costs over 
time, is not the model that characterises the development of political economies of 
communication over the last century. It is a principle of political economy of 
communication that trade follows lines of communication rather than the reverse (Carey, 
1989). The East India Company of the mercantilist era was no more able to function 
without its ships than is the Hughes Electronics media corporation able to function 
without its satellites. Mercantilism, advances in navigation and shipping, the emergence 
of a general credit system, and the rise of the merchant class as a political force are 
mutually defining phenomena in history (Nace, 2003: 22-4). The elements of political 
economy cannot be separated and understood at the same time.  
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McChesney and Schiller (2003) express the confusions that confront political 
economists of communication when they ignore this fact:  
The conventional explanation of globalized communication centres on technology: that 
radical improvements in communication technology make global media flows and global 
business operations feasible and that, in general, this is all to the good. However, this is a 
misleading account. Underlying new communication technology has been a political 
force: the shift to neoliberal orthodoxy, which relaxed or eliminated barriers to 
commercial exploitation of media, foreign investment in communication systems, and 
concentrated media ownership. There is nothing inherent in the technology that required 
neoliberalism; new digital communications could have been used, for example, simply to 
enhance public service provision had a society elected to do so. Encased in a framework 
of neoliberal practice and policy, however, communications instead suddenly became 
subject to transnational corporate-commercial development. (2003: 6) 
The authors attribute to ‘neoliberalism’ the ways in which global political economies of 
communication have formed around new media. To say that, except for ‘neoliberalism’, 
‘new digital communications could have been used … simply to enhance public service 
provision’ is similar to saying that, “except for fascism, radio could have been used to 
promote peace and understanding in the mid-twentieth century”—that is to say, it ignores 
the “economic” part of political economies. The corporations that produce new media are 
the same corporations that have most benefited from them. New media are not produced 
according to the needs and wants of a social totality, a ‘society’ that chooses to use them 
in one way or another. Rather, new media are produced within specific contexts according 
to particular interests and particular values, precisely to increase and expand those values. 
As Silverstone points out, ‘[g]lobal economies and global finance cannot work without a 
global information infrastructure’; they are in fact the basis of ‘globalisation’ (1999: 144). 
Yet, he says, global corporations ‘are threatened by the same media technologies’ they 
rely upon to operate, again because of the values they promote: ‘speed can kill and undo 
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reason as well as facilitate transactions and speculations’ (1999: 144). This appears to be 
happening as I write. 
Towards a coherent theory and method for political economies of communication 
Four writers stand out to me as providing the basic elements from which to 
synthesise a coherent approach to political economy of communication: Dallas Smythe 
(1981), Karl Marx (1973), Roger Silverstone (1999), and Jay Lemke (1995). This 
(perhaps unlikely) combination of authors provides four elements that are of direct 
relevance to understanding political economy of communication: Smythe for his theory of 
consciousness; Marx for his theory of value; Silverstone for his theory of mediation; and 
Lemke for his theory of meaning. I only have space here to quote a key passage from 
each. But these elements I believe are essential to developing a coherent political 
economy of communication: 
Smythe defines ‘consciousness’ as   
the total awareness of life which people have. It includes their understanding of 
themselves as individuals and of their relations with other individuals in a variety of forms 
of organization, as well as with their natural environment. Consciousness is a dynamic 
process. It grows and decays with the interaction of doing (or practice) and cognition over 
the life cycle of the individual in the family and other social formations. It draws on 
emotions, ideas, instincts, memory and all the other sensory apparatus. (1981: 270-1)  
Smythe’s is an historically and culturally specific, materialist definition of human 
experience that explains how we comprehend our world as a totality. Consciousness—
being conscious—is a significant aspect of human activity. It includes how we evaluate 
our world. As I have said here, perhaps too many times already, the ways in which we 
evaluate various aspects of our world—what are ordinarily called our “values”—is an 
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essential inclusion in any political economy of communication. Marx is worth quoting 
here:  
To develop the concept of capital it is necessary to begin not with labour but with value, 
and, precisely, with exchange value in an already developed movement of circulation. It is 
just as impossible to make the transition directly from labour to capital as it is to go from 
the different human races directly to the banker, or from nature to the steam engine. 
(Marx, 1973: 259) 
While it may start with a theory of exchange values, political economy needs to go 
beyond traditional understandings of value. As our political economic systems have 
become technically more sophisticated, more intimate facets of human activity have 
become subsumed as part of what is broadly called “the economy”. They have been 
incorporated as saleable aspects of human activity, or what is generally called labour. 
This general tendency is exemplified in terms like “knowledge worker” and “knowledge 
economy”. Terms like these presuppose forms of labour that can be bought and sold in 
order to produce artefacts of conscious activity, or what might be called ‘knowledge 
commodities’ (Graham 1999 2000). These, in turn, can be alienated from their source 
(conscious human activity), technologically objectified, and then traded within an 
emergent “global economy”.  
This emergent economy is organised primarily around the production of symbolic 
artefacts and is facilitated by proliferating new media. With this progression, new and 
more abstract forms of value have developed that correspond to the newly-formalised 
“labours of abstraction” in the knowledge economy. These forms of value are not merely 
monetary, although they may be traded for money at some stage. They need to be 
understood, and I have argued elsewhere that language is the way into this system. It is 
uncontentious to say that money values permeate societies everywhere and that this has 
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significant impacts on how they operate. But the enthronement of money as the primary 
evaluative principle cannot be explained by the character of money itself. Somehow it 
gets to be this way through the promotion of the significance of money as a value. This, I 
argue, is achieved by the manipulation of other aspects of value, which in turn necessarily 
requires the movement of meanings from one set of institutional contexts (the 
commercial) into all other aspects of human experience (Graham, 2001). Consequently 
political economy of communication requires a theory of movement that incorporates the 
dimensions of space and time:  
Mediation involves the movement of meaning from one text to another, from one 
discourse to another, from one event to another. It involves the constant transformation of 
meanings, both large scale and small, significant and insignificant, as media texts and 
texts about media circulate in writing, in speech and audiovisual forms, and as we, 
individually and collectively, directly and indirectly, contribute to their production 
(Silverstone, 1999: 13)  
Mediation moves meanings through and across space and time, linking and delinking 
spaces, places, and times (1999: 14). The process of mediation ‘involves the work of 
institutions, groups and technologies’ and is ‘the product of textual unravelling in the 
words, deeds and experiences of everyday life, as much as by the continuities of 
broadcasting and narrowcasting’ (1999: 15).  
With these three concepts, framed in these particular ways, we have the basis for 
theoretically grasping the basic elements of political economies of communication. 
Analytically, this leaves us to understand the various dimensions of meaning itself. These 
can be described within a three-term system as defined by Lemke (1995): the 
Presentational, or the “aboutness” of meaning; the Attitudinal, or the evaluative aspects of 
meaning; and the Organisational, or how meanings derive coherence.  
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Through the synthesis of these authors’ theories and methods, the ways in which 
political economies of communication work can be grasped in relation to political 
economy more generally and particular instances of communication. There are many sites 
that need to be understood in the current context, violent, vicious, and destructive as it is. 
Politics, finance, and military propaganda; resistance, revolution, and technological 
change; commercial production, distribution, exchange, and consumption; 
fundamentalisms of all sorts, peace activism, and environmental struggles throughout the 
world are now conducted largely within the realms of communication. This has become 
so much the case that it may well be that political economies of communication have 
become the most important aspect of political economy for understanding global social 
dynamics.  
Conclusion 
I have outlined a history of political economy of communication and shown its 
20th century roots and theory relevance for understanding what a political economy of 
communication means in the current context. I have also conducted a brief review of 
mainstream political economy of communication and offered a brief critique of dominant 
approaches in pursuit of a coherent theory and method that will provide us with an 
understanding of how communication figures in the new media environment. Of course, 
much more could be said on the subject, and I hope this chapter will provide the impetus 
for such studies.  
Political economy of communication in the current context is about the production 
of values at the most fundamental level—the level of consciousness—and the exercise of 
power on the broadest possible scale: the totality of human beings now joined in a global 
system of social relations. New media inevitably lead to new political economic 
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formations. New political economic formations are new systems that require new 
understandings. In respect of management, the new political economies of communication 
require entirely new understandings that can comprehend the ways in which 
consciousness is produced; ways in which values are produced; the means by which 
meanings are moved; and the ways in which these aspects are realised in specific 
meanings. Through the synthesis of these aspects of political economy, we can begin to 
chart a course through one of the most complex and gigantic systems of social relations 
that has developed in the history of humanity.  
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